Blind man walking on tightrope

If you have watched Squid Game, imagine a competitor who is crippled and cannot see going into a highly-physical challenge.

Thai politics is that competitor, so, to say that the next few weeks is treacherous may be understating things a bit.

Here’s the immediate political calendar: On August 22, the Criminal Court may come up with a ruling on charges of royal defamation against Thaksin Shinawatra. About a week after that, the Constitutional Court will deliver a verdict on his prime minister daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra regarding the Hun Sen phone clip.

On September 9, the Supreme Court will have its say on the 14thfloor controversy.

Analysts believe that the August 22 schedule, while it should generate big news, may not be as politically impactful as the other aforementioned dates. By that, even if Thaksin is found guilty, the government will stay and there will be rooms for him to fight on.

The Hun Sen clip verdict, on the other hand, can shatter the fragile Thai political equilibrium. If somehow Paetongtarn survives, the 14thfloor ruling awaits, with the Medical Council’s stand weighing heavily on the minds of the Supreme Court judges.

Can Paetongtarn pulls off a miraculous escape, getting off the leaked phone conversation hook? Nothing is impossible, but some people are pointing at the fact that the Constitutional Court ended late Samak Sundaravej’s premiership for a “far less” offence.

Paetongtarn is reportedly using a risky line of argument. In her self-defence report submitted to the Constitution Court, she seems to highlight the need to detach Thailand’s political apparatus from the country’s military so negotiations with Cambodia’s Hun Sen would be smooth.

As reported by a mainstream media outlet, she controversially suggested that referring to the Thai Second Army Region commander as “the opposition” was an important tactic. That tactic called for perceived separation of the Thai political governance from the military mechanisms which were angering Cambodia.

In other words, she is telling the court that, in trying her best to make negotiations successful which would be beneficial to Thailand, she had to make Hun Sen feel more comfortable talking to her.

Even the People’s Party, which traditionally ignores what it considers to be irrational nationalistic fervers, has admitted that Paetongtarn had shot herself in the foot the way she referred to the Thai army in the phone talk with Hun Sen.

Rumours have spread about a previous impossibility, a Paetongtarn resignation before the Constitutional Court can deem her ethically unfit to be prime minister. Helping fuel the rumours is the 14th floor case.

Pheu Thai will be floored if Paetongtarn and Thaksin lose big court battles in the same month. Her resignation might make it easier (though not so much) for the party to regroup and try to keep the coalition together.

But we are entering the realm of pure speculation nonetheless if Thailand needs a new prime minister.

One scenario is the rise of Anutin Charnvirakul. There are two ways he could become prime minister. The Bhumjaithai leader either has to cut a deal with Pheu Thai and go back to the freakish coalition, or he makes a gentlemen agreement with the People’s Party and keep Pheu Thai out of the equation.

The tentative Anutin-People’s Party temporary alliance will need more conservative support. The main sticking point would be the People’s Party’s strong demands for an early House dissolution and drastic as well as fast-paced charter amendments.

Another scenario is a return of Prayut Chan-o-cha, if he agrees to resign from the Privy Council, that is. This would create another major irony because his appointment as prime minister will need to be supported by Pheu Thai, which had made “We will fight him till we die” its election platform.

Pheu Thai itself has one more name left on its prime ministerial nomination list, but Chaikasem Nitisiri is reportedly too ill to take up demanding obligations. Actually, though, age and health can be the least of Pheu Thai’s concern, as the conservatives’ continued support is a lot more important.

A way back into love between Pheu Thai and the People’s Party? That is impossible, because while the conservatives have gritted their teeth and bore the Entertainment Complex, the People’s Party has declared it would never accept the project.

A House dissolution? It would bring Thailand back to Square One, because after Cambodia and a few local scandals, the People’s Party can kiss a huge landslide victory goodbye although it might still emerge the winner.

A coup? Again, the Square One. Like an election, there can be promises of positive changes at first but everything can easily fall through.

In Squid Game, there is no happy way out. All but one have to die.

But that is just a movie, so you don’t have to live with any consequence.