Column: America's "Golden Dome": a futile attempt with no winners

Instead of learning from this history, the United States has doubled down, once again disregarding international security in its pursuit of "absolute security." The result is destined to be a repeat of past failures.

by Liu Chong, Xie Hao

Recently, as details of the U.S. "Golden Dome" missile defense system begin to emerge, global attention is increasingly drawn to this project which aims to populate outer space with weapons in the future.

It is evident that the United States, a self-serving state, relentlessly pursues absolute security for itself, attempting to turn space into an exclusive American "arsenal" to intimidate any who defies it. Despite its obsession with "single-handed win," the result is often self-defeating, leaving even the proclaimed "winner" with nothing but losses.

UNRELENTING OBSESSION WITH STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Since the Reagan era, successive U.S. administrations have prioritized missile defense in their security policies, persistently harboring the delusion of eliminating all external threats through an "absolutely secure" defense system.

In the heated Cold War space race with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, then U.S. President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as "Star Wars." This initiative, violating the principles of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, advocated developing and deploying high-energy directed-energy weapons and conventional strike weapons in space and on land to intercept Soviet nuclear missiles at every phase and multiple layers. The aim was to permanently dismantle the Soviet strategic threat and achieve "absolute security."

After the Cold War, the United States has continuously developed its strategic missile defense capabilities. During the Clinton administration, the country enacted the National Missile Defense Act, explicitly stating it was designed only to counter limited ballistic missile attacks and not to defend against Russian or Chinese strategic missiles. However, this legal commitment was shredded by the U.S. Congress's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017. This act formally lifted restrictions on U.S. national missile defense capabilities, overturning previous U.S. commitments to limit the scale and capability of its missile defense and not target Russian and Chinese strategic forces.

Even before withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States established the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to coordinate the development of new missile defense technologies, and conducted numerous missile defense tests. Upon taking office, George W. Bush, confident that the technology was mature, tore up the ABM Treaty and sought to build an integrated missile defense system, vigorously developing homeland intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) defense, only to be frustrated by repeated test failures. The Obama administration decided to prioritize mature technologies, focusing its missile defense efforts on sea-based regional defense, while planning for significant long-term strategic missile defense potential.

Words circulated during Donald Trump's first term that his Missile Defense Review would explicitly target Chinese and Russian strategic capabilities, but the Pentagon reportedly deemed the capability was insufficient to support this goal, forcing a reluctant abandonment of the plan. Upon Trump's returning to office, the United States convinced itself the technology was now ready and swiftly announced the construction of the "Golden Dome" missile defense system. Its stated aim is to build an unconstrained, global, multi-layer and multi-domain missile defense system to counter all missile threats.

The shadow of the failed "Star Wars" program has barely faded. Instead of learning from this history, the United States has doubled down, once again disregarding international security in its pursuit of "absolute security." The result is destined to be a repeat of past failures.

AMERICA'S "STRATEGIC LIABILITY"

Compared to the simple and decisive executive order, actual capabilities cannot be developed overnight. The project's implementation faces numerous difficult-to-resolve challenges.

-- Exorbitant Costs: The United States ambitiously stated that the "Golden Dome" system would cost approximately 175 billion U.S. dollars. Beyond the 25 billion dollars in initial funding planned for fiscal year 2026, an estimated 50 billion dollars annually is projected thereafter. However, according to the estimation by Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the total cost of the "Golden Dome" program could soar to 500 billion dollars. Based on patterns in U.S. military R&D and deployment costs, it is highly unlikely the program will stay within its initial budget. Theodore Postol, MIT professor emeritus and missile expert, said that Trump's missile project would be a huge black hole for taxpayer' dollars, and it would get nothing in return.

-- Uncertain Timeline: Estimates for when the "Golden Dome" might be operational vary widely depending on the source. From the executive branch, Trump aims for completion within three years -- meaning before the end of his term. From a military professional standpoint, U.S. defense officials state that developing the space-based weapons alone for "Golden Dome" would take at least five to seven years. From a budgeting perspective, the CBO predicts the project could span up to 20 years. Given the typical pattern of U.S. governance and historical experience, it is highly improbable that the next administration would continue the policies of its predecessor. The "Golden Dome" project becoming an abandoned boondoggle is almost inevitable.

-- Unproven Technology: The core of the "Golden Dome" project lies in space-based missile tracking sensors and space-based interceptors. One of the two most formidable technical challenges are developing boost-phase intercept capability, and the other is achieving rapid, uninterrupted detection and interception capabilities against hypersonic weapons. Currently, U.S. boost-phase interception remains largely conceptual and in early development phase. Globally, there is no mature technology for intercepting hypersonic weapons either. Overcoming these significant and unresolved technical hurdles is far from an overnight task.

BOUND TO BACKFIRE

The world does not belong solely to America; it is the shared home of all humanity. The "Golden Dome" project represents a plunder of other nations' security, a threat to global security, and an erosion of human peace. It pushes an already conflict-ridden security situation further towards the abyss, likely intensifying the major countries' arms race and further dashing humanity's hopes for peace.

The "Golden Dome" plan categorically rejects the core principle underpinning global strategic stability: the inseparable relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It shatters the "mutual assured destruction" balance between nuclear powers. The project proposes a massive increase in space-based combat capabilities, including the R&D and deployment of orbital interception systems, turning outer space into an environment for placing weapons and an arena for armed confrontation, worsening the overall situation.

For the United States itself, the so-called "absolute security" it pursues is a fallacy. Any U.S. pre-emptive strike would invite retaliation on a broader scale. Nations seeking self-defense will redouble their efforts to develop offensive weapons, engaging the United States in a new round of arms race. The detrimental consequences of the arms race triggered by "Golden Dome" will inevitably backfire. The United States itself will struggle to bear the enormous costs brought by the escalation of this arms race. Ultimately, it will be hoisted by its own petard -- a self-inflicted wound borne of its own actions.

America's "Golden Dome" is a futile attempt with no winners. How the world responds to "Golden Dome" concerns the very survival of humanity's future: will it meaninglessly accelerate a vicious arms race, undermining everyone's security and squandering development resources? Or will nations, within an environment of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, strive to collaborate on governance and achieve shared security? The world is watching America's choice and will inevitably deliver a forceful response to safeguard strategic security.

Editor's note: Liu Chong is a research fellow and director of Center for Science, Technology and Strategy at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Xie Hao is an assistant research fellow at the CICIR.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Xinhua News Agency.■